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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
In the Interest of
N.A.M., A child under the
age of eighteen years,
Case No. 981050-CA
Appellee.
D.M. and A.M.

Priority No. 4

Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH
JURISDICTION
Dennis and Amy Mace appeal from a final order of the
Eighth District Juvenile Court, terminating their parental rights
to N.A.M., pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 1997).
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) (Supp. 1997) and

§ 78-3a-909

(1996) .
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the juvenile court's conclusions of

abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure of parental adjustment
and token efforts are correct given the unchallenged findings of
fact and supportive record evidence.
Standard of Review; The precise standard of review
applicable to this case appears to be a matter of first
impression in this state. Appellants are correct in the basic
proposition that the juvenile court's application of law to fact
is reviewed by this Court for "correctness."

State v. Pena, 869
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P. 2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1994) . However, appellants omit to
mention that the juvenile court is entitled to a degree of
discretion in making the ultimate determination of whether a
given set of facts supports the legal conclusion of unfitness.
Id.

However, the precise degree of discretion to be allowed in

parental rights termination cases has not yet been definitively
established.1
Pena articulated several factors to be considered in
determining what degree of discretion is warranted in any given
case.

Id. at 938-39.

Applying these factors to the present

case indicates that a substantial degree of discretion should be
afforded to the juvenile court.

First, the complicated factual

scenario of this case warrants granting greater deference to the
juvenile court's decision.

Id.; see also State ex rel. M.L.. 965

P.2d 551, 553 fn. 1 (Utah App. 1998)(noting parental rights
termination cases are highly fact sensitive).

Second, while

there is a substantial body of law concerning parental rights
terminations, the nature of these cases is such that there will
never be an all-encompassing or definitive legal rule which
1

In several prior cases this Court has indicated that the
juvenile court's legal conclusions of unfitness under the
termination of Parental Rights Act are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. In re Adoption of B.O., 927 P.2d 202, 206 (Utah App.
1996) (construing "token efforts" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a407); State ex rel. G.V., 916 P.2d 919, 920 (Utah App. 1993)
(court's determination of abandonment reviewed for abuse of
discretion); State ex rel. R.A.F., 863 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah App.
1993)(construing abandonment under former Termination of Parental
Rights Act and reviewing for abuse of discretion). Of these
three cases, only B.O. was decided post-Pena.
It is up to the
appellate court's to establish legal standards, but trial courts
should be granted considerable discretion in the application of
facts to that standard.
2
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applies to every factual scenario.

Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39.

Third, the juvenile court judge had the opportunity to observe
the appearance and demeanor of these low functioning parents at
trial which the record cannot hope to adequately reflect.

Id/

Finally, because appellants have chosen to accept the
factual findings of the juvenile court and are only making a
legal challenge to their sufficiency, they are not entitled to
distort those findings and the underlying evidence.

Rather

appellants must simply accept the juvenile court's findings and
the evidence and reasonable inferences should only be entertained
to the extent they support the court's ultimate conclusion.
Labrum v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1983).
2.

Whether the juvenile court's finding regarding the

father's inability to care for himself was supported by
sufficient evidence.
Standard of Review: In order to successfully challenge
the juvenile court's findings, the parent must marshal the
evidence supporting the findings and then show that the findings
are so lacking in support that they are against the clear weight
2

Pena also indicated that, in some situations, there may be
countervailing policy reasons for limiting the court's
discretion. 869 P.2d at 939. In particular, the Court pointed
to the determination of voluntariness of consent and found that
the "varying fact patterns. . . were not so unmanageable in their
variety as to outweigh the interest in having uniform legal
rules." Id. As argued above, the possible fact patterns in
parental abuse and neglect cases are virtually infinite and do
not lend themselves well to fixed rules. Accordingly, while
there are clearly important rights to be protected in these
cases, the complicated and varying factual scenarios make it
inappropriate to divest juvenile court judges of substantial
discretion.
3
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of the evidence.

State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah

App. 1997).
<

3.

Whether the juvenile court's finding regarding the

number of parenting sessions attended by appellants was supported
by sufficient evidence.
i

Standard of Review: In order to successfully challenge
the juvenile court's findings, the parent must marshal the
evidence supporting the findings and then show that the findings
are so lacking in support that they are against the clear weight
of the evidence.

State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah

App. 1997) .
STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 1997).
i

2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-408 (Supp. 1997).
(Addendum A ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS")
petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Dennis and Amy
Mace to N.A.M. on or about May 8, 1997.

(R. 105-11).

Trial on

i

the petition was held October 28-29, 1997 before Eighth District
Juvenile Court Judge Scott N. Johanson.

The juvenile court

entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

i

Terminating Parental Rights on December 1, 1997, which order
terminated the Maces1 rights to N.A.M. (R. 402-17; Addendum B ) .
\

4
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The Maces filed a Notice of Appeal on December 31, 1997. (R.
421-22).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dennis Mace ("father") and Amy Mace ("mother") are the
natural parents of N.A.M, a female child, born April 22, 1996.
(R. 403).
A referral was made to DCFS by hospital personnel
shortly after N.A.M.'s birth, alleging, among other things, that
the mother was not bonding to the infant and would not feed her.
There was also a concern that the parents did not have the
ability to care for the baby's heart problem which required the
use of a heart monitor.

(R. 2-3, 403-04, 465 at 46-47) .

N.A.M. was taken into DCFS custody on April 24, 1996.
The parents admitted to the allegations contained in the State's
Verified Petition on June 5, 1996. The juvenile court, on that
date, ordered that N.A.M. be returned home under an order of
protective supervision.

(R. 33-38, 404).

N.A.M. was readmitted to the hospital the same day as
adjudication.

Hospital staff refused to release N.A.M. to her

parents until they had been properly trained in CPR and use of
the heart monitor.

(R. 404).

N.A.M. was taken into DCFS custody for a second time on
June 10, 1996, and another Verified Petition was filed by the
State on June 12, 1996 alleging that the parents (1) failed to
attend all the offered training related to use of the heart

5
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1
monitor, (2) that they were not proficient enough in CPR and
operation of the heart monitor to safely care for the child, (3)
that the mother lacked the knowledge to safely care for her child
in the event of an emergency even after a CPR lesson, and
that they did not visit the child for two full days.

(4)

A combined

shelter, adjudication, and dispositional hearing took place on
June 12, 1996.

DCFS was awarded custody of the child but she was

ordered to be returned to the parents as soon as they became
proficient in CPR and use of the heart monitor.

(R. 15-20, 40-

45, 404).
DCFS prepared a court-ordered service plan which the
1

parents signed on July 10, 1996.

The parents were required to 1)

visit the child as often as possible, 2) secure a home
appropriate for a newborn infant, and 3) demonstrate appropriate
skills to care for N.A.M.

(Exh. #3).

With regard to visitation, it occurred fairly regularly
between June and August 1996.
toward the end of August 1996.

DCFS lost contact with the parents
There was no visitation between

August 27 and December 18, 1996, because the parents didn't
request any and their whereabouts were unknown.

(R. 406-07, 465

at 70, 79). The DCFS caseworker made extraordinary efforts to
find the parents and encourage them to visit N.A.M. and work on
their service plan during these months.

(R. 465 at 70-71, 73-74,

76, 79, 155) .
Between June and December 1996, the parent's living
arrangements were unsatisfactory to DCFS.

They were either

6
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living with relatives or friends who were not acceptable due to
prior substantiated sex abuse referrals, or in homes which did
not meet the basic minimum standards for cleanliness.

The

parents did obtain suitable housing in mid-December 1996.

(R.

406, 465 at 115-17, 127, 151).
With regard to the third requirement of the service
plan, a peer-parent was assigned to the parents on June 12, 1996,
the day the second petition was adjudicated, to teach them
parenting skills.

The peer-parent worked intensively with the

Maces between June and August 1996, spending 20 days in the home,
but felt they exhibited a lack of love, concern, attachment, and
desire to parent N.A.M.

The peer-parent was also concerned that

the parents were not retaining what they had been taught.

(R.

404-06, 466 at 326, 329). There was also a dispute over whether
the mother and the father passed the required medical training
for N.A.M.

(R. 406, 465 at 62).
Psychological evaluations were completed on both

parents, during the time the first service plan was in effect, in
May 1996. Although the mother was found to have various
problems, such as lack of insight, the evaluation indicated she
had the cognitive ability to learn parenting skills.

(R. 466 at

304; Exh. #7). The father, however was found to be mildly
mentally retarded and lacking the cognitive abilities to care for
a child without significant assistance.

His score on the Global

Assessment of Functioning Scale was very low at 30. The score of
an average functioning person is between 65 and 80.
7
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Such a low

score indicated significant pathologies and concerns about the
father's ability to function.

Mr. Mace was given several

diagnoses, including a personality disorder with schizotypal
features.

(R. 282-88, 407, 466 at 312, 319; Exh. #6).
Because the parents had made very little progress on

the first service plan, a second was issued on or about January
1, 1997.

(R.

408, 465 at 237; Exh. # 3 ) . The second plan was

more specific and easy to understand.

The caseworker went over

the plan's requirements very carefully with the parents to ensure
they understood what was expected of them and the urgency of
completing it immediately.

The second plan required the parents

to 1) enroll in parenting classes, 2) maintain appropriate
housing, 3) attend visits with N.A.M. and take an active role in
her care and progress, and 4) explore occupational and
educational opportunities and plan financially for self
sufficiency.

(R. 408-09; Exh. #3).

During the first three months of the second service
plan, the parents failed to enroll in parenting classes, as
required, even though everything had been arranged by DCFS.

(R.

409, 465 at 208, 238, 252-53).
The parents did maintain appropriate housing during the
period the second treatment plan was in effect.

(R. 409, 465 at

238) .
Peer parenting resumed at the commencement of the
second service plan, but had to be started at the beginning
because the parents had retained nothing from the previous
8
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sessions.

(R. 409, 466 at 340). The peer parent saw no

improvement in the Maces' parenting skills during this treatment
plan and felt they were just going through the motions. The
parents seemed uncomfortable during visits and acted relieved
when they were over.

(R. 410, 466 at 345, 352, 372). The Maces

missed approximately half of the visits offered them between
January and April of 1997,

(R. 408-410).

Finally, the parents did nothing to explore
occupational or educational opportunities during the second
service plan, even though they admitted to having extreme
financial problems.

(R. 465 at 242, 466 at 366).

In March of 1997, a bonding assessment was conducted on
N.A.M., the Maces, and the foster parents.

The assessment

concluded there was no significant bond between N.A.M. and her
natural parents, and that the Maces lacked the basic parenting
skills necessary to care for the emotional and physical wellbeing of their child.

Conversely, the baby exhibited a secure,

healthy, normal parent/child attachment to the foster parents,
with whom she has resided since her birth.

(R. 410, 466 at 389) .

The juvenile court terminated reunification services to
the parents at the 12-month dispositional hearing on April 23,
1997.

(R. 88-90).

DCFS filed a petition for termination of

parental rights on or about May 8, 1997.

(R. 105-11).

Trial on the parental deprivation petition was held on
October 28 and 29, 1997. The juvenile court entered its
Memorandum Decision on November 6, 1997. Findings of Fact,
9
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Conclusions of Law, and Order Terminating Parental Rights were
prepared from that memorandum decision and entered on December 1,
1997.

The parental rights of Dennis and Amy Mace were terminated

to N.A.M. on grounds of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, out-ofhome placement, failure of parental adjustment, token efforts,
and best interests.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 1997).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellants challenge most, but not all, of the juvenile
court's conclusion of law supporting the termination of their
parental rights.

However, they do not challenge the pertinent

findings of fact underlying the challenged conclusions of law.
The parents either argue that none of the findings support the
conclusions or that the existing findings do not justify reaching
a particular conclusion of law.
Appellants claims are all without merit because they
ignore the pertinent findings of fact that form a basis for each
conclusion.

Furthermore, the parents apparently accept the

findings of fact because they do not challenge their sufficiency,
except two limited instances.

Given the court's findings that

the parents (1) lost interest in their child, (2) failed to visit
or communicate for significant periods of time, (3) failed to
learn appropriate parenting skills despite provision of diligent
services, (4) failed to avail themselves of services, and (5)
were either unable or unwilling to make significant changes in
their parenting deficiencies, the juvenile court correctly

10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reached conclusions of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure
of parental adjustment and token efforts.
Finally, appellants do challenge the court's findings
of fact regarding their lack of attendance at one session of
parenting classes and the father's inability to care for himself.
Even if these findings were clearly erroneous, overturning them
would not change the outcome.

However, because appellants

failed to meet their burden of marshalling the evidence, and
thereby ignored the sufficient evidence supporting the findings,
this Court should affirm the findings.
ARGUMENT
I. THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY REACHED ITS
CONCLUSIONS OF ABANDONMENT, NEGLECT,
UNFITNESS, FAILURE OF PARENTAL ADJUSTMENT AND
TOKEN EFFORTS BASED ON THE COURT'S
UNCHALLENGED FINDINGS OF FACT.
The Maces argue that the juvenile court's conclusions
of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure of parental
adjustment and token efforts have no support in the court's
findings of fact and, therefore, the order terminating their
parental rights should be reversed.

Appellants apparently accept

the underlying findings of fact - with the exception of two
findings which are irrelevant to the arguments below - because
they do not mount a sufficiency challenge.3

Instead, the Maces

3

In order to challenge sufficiency the Maces would bear the
burden of marshalling the evidence which they have not even
attempted to do. See State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960
(Utah App. 1997).
11
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choose to challenge the correctness of the juvenile court's legal
conclusions while accepting the underlying findings.
Moreover, although appellants challenge most of the
grounds for termination of their parental rights, they do not
challenge every ground relied upon by the juvenile court.

For

example, the juvenile court relied upon the ground identified in
Utah Code Ann. section 78-3a-407(4), which is the failure of the
parents to remedy their circumstances while the child is in an
out-of-home placement.

(R. 412-13).

The Maces do not attempt to

challenge this basis for termination.
This Court can affirm the parental termination order on
any separate, independent ground found by the juvenile court.
E.g. State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 1997).
Thus, even assuming the court erred in terminating parental
rights based on some of the other statutory grounds, the parental
termination order can be affirmed on the unchallenged ground
under section 78-3a-407 (4).

However, as demonstrated below, the

juvenile court correctly reached all its conclusions that the
additional statutory grounds for termination had been proven as
well.
A. The Juvenile Court Correctly Concluded
Appellants Abandoned Their Child,
The Maces challenge the juvenile court's legal
conclusion that they abandoned N.A.M.

In support of this

argument, they assert that (1) no findings support the
abandonment conclusion, (2) their conduct does not meet the
12
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statutory criteria for abandonment, and (3) their conduct was not
as "outrageous" as the conduct depicted in prior case law.
(Appellant's Br. at 15-18).
The Termination of Parental Rights Act provides that a
prima facie case of abandonment is proven when the parents have
"failed to have shown the normal interest of a natural parent
without just cause."
1997).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-408 (1) (c) (Supp.

Utah Courts have recognized that the statutory

definitions of abandonment are supplemented by a two-part test:
Abandonment consists of conduct on the part
of the parent which implies [1] a conscious
disregard of the obligations owed by a parent
to the child, [2] leading to the destruction
of the parent-child relationship.
See State ex rel. G.V., 916 P.2d 918, 920-21 (Utah App. 1996)
(Utah courts required to apply two part test in determining
whether the child has been abandoned); State ex rel. M.S. v.
Lochner, 815 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah App. 1991).
Utah courts have continually found that parents'
failure to regularly visit their children and their failure to
even write letters or make phone calls is sufficient to meet both
prongs of the abandonment test.

See G.V., 916 P.2d at 920-21;

see also State ex rel. E.R., 918 P.2d 162 (Utah App. 1996); State
ex rel. M.S. v. Lochner, 815 P.2d 1325 (Utah App. 1991); In re
J.P.M., 808 P.2d 1122 (Utah App. 1991).
Contrary to the appellants' assertions, the juvenile
court's unchallenged findings regarding their conduct supports
both the statutory and the case law criteria for abandonment.
13
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After N.A.M. was removed from their care twice due to their
inability to care for her in April and June of 1996, the Maces
began to lose interest in her by August of 1996 - a mere two
months after the second removal.
They began to disengage and absent themselves from the
peer parenting sessions and visitation with the child.
1 I.).

(R. 406;

They disappeared and failed to request visits with their

child for nearly four months beginning in late August, and failed
to contact or communicate with DCFS about their child during the
same time period.

(R. 406-07; ^

K. and L.).

The Maces also

missed approximately one-half of the scheduled visits in March
and April of 1997.

(R. 410; H U . ) .

On April 24, 1997, the juvenile court terminated DCFS's
obligation to provide reunification services, and from that date
until the trial in October the Maces did not attempt to visit or
communicate with their child.

(R. 410-11; f V . ) .

Based upon the foregoing unchallenged findings, the
juvenile court correctly concluded that the Maces conduct met the
legal criteria for abandonment.
B. The Juvenile Court Concluded Ms, Mace
Neglected Her Child,

The Maces next argue that the juvenile court erred in
concluding that Ms. Mace neglected N.A.M.

They again assert

that no findings support this conclusion of law supporting
termination.

They further claim that no statutory circumstances
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were proven under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-408(2).

(Appellant's

Br. at 18-20).
The juvenile court concluded that Ms. Mace had
neglected N.A.M. by her "repeated or continuous failure to
provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter,
education or other care necessary for the physical, mental and
emotional health and development of the child" despite her
ability to provide such care.

(R. 411; H B.); see Utah Code

Ann. § 78-3a-408(2) (d) (Supp. 1997).
The court's unchallenged findings demonstrate that,
although her evaluation showed her capable of providing such
care, Ms. Mace lost interest in her child, abdicated to others
her responsibility for caring for the child, failed to obtain
appropriate housing for a lengthy period of time, and failed to
avail herself of services designed to assist her in learning
appropriate parenting skills as well as services necessary for
providing direct care to her child (i.e., WIC program).
410; %% F. , I., J., K., L., R., S., and U.).

(R. 405-

Based on these

unchallenged findings, the juvenile court correctly concluded
under section 78-3a-408(2) that Ms. Mace neglected N.A.M.4
C. The Juvenile Court Correctly Concluded
Mr, Mace Is Unfit To Parent His Child,
The Maces also challenge the juvenile court's
conclusion of unfitness. Although they challenge the finding as

4

The court's conclusions reference section 78-3a-407(2) as
the actual ground for termination, but section -408(2) is the
type of evidence necessary to prove the ground for termination.
15
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to both Mr. and Ms. Mace, the juvenile court only found unfitness
as to Mr. Mace.

(R. 412). The Maces claim the unfitness

conclusion is incorrect because (1) no findings support the
conclusion; (2) N.A.M. was originally removed from them based on
dependency rather than any fault-based type of conduct; (3) Mr.
Mace was capable of learning to care for N.A.M. with Ms. Mace's
help; and (4) they both technically complied with certain aspects
of the treatment plan.

(Appellant's Br. at 20-23).

The juvenile court concluded that Mr. Mace is unfit due
to a mental deficiency that "renders him unable to care for the
immediate and continuous physical or emotional needs of the child
for an extended period of time."

(R. 412).

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-3a-408 (2) (a) (Supp. 1997),.

Given the clear evidence

supporting the court's conclusion of unfitness, appellants
arguments regarding the reasons for N.A.M.'s initial removal and
Mr. Mace's limited compliance with some aspects of a service plan
are irrelevant.

The real concern in the court's view is Mr.

Mace's fundamental inability to parent N.A.M. due to his mental
deficiencies.
The Mace's claims that no findings support the
unfitness conclusion and that Mr. Mace is capable of learning to
care for N.A.M. are also without merit.

The juvenile court's

unchallenged findings demonstrate that despite DCFS's diligent
services - including intensive daily parenting training for the
few months the Maces would accept this service - Mr. Mace was
unable to retain anything he was taught and he lacked the basic
cognitive abilities to care for a child.

(R. 405-410; *h*h F., G.,
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H., I., M., S.; and U.; see also Psychological Evaluation of Mr.
Mace, State's Exh. #6; R. 466 at 304-05 (testimony of
evaluator)) .5
Based on these unchallenged findings, the juvenile
court correctly concluded that Mr. Mace is unfit.

See State ex

rel. W.D.,111 v. W.M.. 856 P.2d 363 (Utah App. 1993) (upholding
termination of parental rights on grounds of unfitness where
father with psychological problems was unlikely to resolve his
parenting deficiencies in the future despite services provided by
state); State ex rel. C.Y. v. Yates, 764 P.2d 251 (Utah App.
1988) (upholding termination of parental rights based upon
unfitness where no significant improvement in parenting skills
occurred despite the father's attempt to complete court-ordered
treatment plan).

D. The Juvenile Court Correctly Concluded
Appellants Experienced A Failure Of Parental
Adjustment,
The Maces challenge the juvenile court's conclusion of
failure of parental adjustment because they claim they resolved
5

The psychological evaluation, upon which the court's
conclusion is based, states:
It would appear that intellectual dysfunction would
likely prohibit [Mr. Mace] from being able to
adequately care for his child.
It appears unlikely that [Mr. Mace] would be able to
adequately care for his child without considerable
assistance.
He appears to lack the cognitive skills
and motivation to provide for the needs of a young
infant and seemed to minimize the importance of the
evaluation process in determining his ability to do so.
(State's Exh. #6, p. 5 ) .
17
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i

the circumstances that led to N.A.M.'s out-of-home placement and,
therefore, the statutory criteria had not been met.
*

Specifically, they claim the only reasons for out-of-home
placement were their inadequate housing and lack of certification
for N.A.M.'s heart monitor.

(Appellant's Br. at 23-25).

Their
{

arguments are not accurate.
To terminate parental rights based on failure of
parental adjustment, the court must determine the following

(

criteria have been met:
'Failure of parental adjustment' means that a
parent or parents are unable or unwilling
within a reasonable time to substantially
correct the circumstances, conduct, or
conditions that led to placement of their
child outside of their home, notwithstanding
reasonable and appropriate efforts made by
the Division of Child and Family Services to
return the child to that home.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-403(2) (Supp. 1997).
The juvenile court interpreted this statutory language

i

(

as including, not only the circumstances that led to the initial
removal, but also any circumstances which developed during the
placement which prevented the child from returning home.
413).

{

(R.

The court's interpretation is reasonable under the plain

language of the statute given that the "circumstances" leading to
out of home placement include any parenting deficiencies creating
those circumstances.6

6

The Maces' interpretation of the statute could conceivably,
require the juvenile court to preserve the parental rights of
unfit parents merely because they were unfit for a reason other
that which initially warranted removal.
18
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*

Even assuming the juvenile court's interpretation is
incorrect, the Maces claim the only circumstances leading to
removal were lack of housing and lack of certification for the
heart monitor.

This is incorrect.

Contrary to their claim,

there were many other circumstances that led to removal: lack of
bonding, failure to feed the child, and lack of interest in
visiting the child after the first removal.
These circumstances were listed in both the state's
petitions, and were admitted to by both parents.

(R. 1-5, 15-20,

33-34, 40-41) . Arguably, the real circumstances leading to
removal were the parents' lack of interest in their child - a
circumstance that ultimately resulted in the parents failing to
comply with treatment plans.

Given all the circumstances that

led to removal, the juvenile court correctly concluded that the
Maces experienced a "failure of parental adjustment" because they
failed to correct those circumstances within a reasonable time
despite reasonable efforts by DCFS.

See State ex rel. G.D., 894

P.2d 1278 (Utah App. 1995) (upholding termination of parental
rights based upon ground of failure of parental adjustment).

E. The Juvenile Court Concluded Appellants
Made Only Token Efforts To Be Reunified With
Their Child,
The Maces also challenge the juvenile court's
conclusion that they "made only token efforts and in some cases
no effort at all to support or communicate with the child, to
eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional
abuse, or to avoid being unfit in accordance with 78-3a-407 (6) ."
19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(Appellant's Br. at 25-26; R. 413).

In support of this

challenge, the Maces claim that they made many efforts, and also
that their conduct is not so egregious as the conduct of other
parents.

{

(Appellant's Br. at 26).
As noted above in Section A., there are ample

unchallenged findings and evidence to support a conclusion of
abandonment. (R. 406-07, 410-11; M

I., K., L., U-, V.).

(

These

same findings, in addition to findings that show noncompliance
with important aspects of treatment plans, demonstrate that the

(

Maces efforts were only token.
Even assuming the Maces made some significant efforts
at times, it is important to recognize that at a critical time in

(

the development of the bond with their infant child — two months
after her placement in state custody as a 2-month old infant and
after overnight visitation had begun - the Maces disappeared for
almost 4 months.

(

This disappearance was certain to destroy any

progress in bonding that had been made.

Then after only two

months of sporadic visitation, the Maces missed many more visits
and then stopped requesting visits entirely.

(

Based on these

unchallenged findings, in addition to the fact that they were
going through the motions of compliance without making any
significant progress, the juvenile court correctly concluded that
the Maces made only token efforts.

20
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{

II. THE FINDING OF FACT REGARDING THE
FATHER'S INABILITY TO CARE FOR HIMSELF IS NOT
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND MOREOVER IS IRRELEVANT
TO THE DETERMINATION OF THIS APPEAL.
The Maces take issue with the juvenile court's finding
of fact which states:
M. Psychological assessments had been
completed on both parents, the conclusions of
which were that while the father lacked the
cognitive abilities to care for himself
without adult assistance, let alone care for
and protect a baby, the mother was capable of
learning parenting skills.
(R. 407). Appellants claim this finding is clearly erroneous
because there is no support in the record for the finding that
Mr. Mace lacked the ability to care for himself.
Contrary to the Maces' claims, there is evidence in the
record to support that portion of the finding and they have
failed to marshal this evidence as required when asserting error
in a court's factual findings.

See State ex rel. M.E.C., 942

P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 1997).

Becky Valcarce, one of the

evaluators who performed the psychological evaluation on Mr.
Mace, testified that his score on the Global Assessment of
Functioning "would indicate some significant pathologies and some
concerns regarding ability to function physically and
psychologically and socially."

(R. 466 at 319).

In addition, the evaluation, admitted as State's
Exhibit 6 without objection (R. 466 at 301), states, on page 5,
that the "results of [Mr. Mace's] intellectual/academic testing
suggested that he should experience significant difficulty in
comprehending and meeting the intellectual demands of his day-to-

21
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day and occupational functioning."

The evaluation also states,

at page 6, that Mr. Mace "should be provided services through a
program for mentally retarded individuals to assist him in

(

learning adaptive behavior skills related to independent living,
such as self care and home care."

Given this record evidence,

the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Mace

(

lacked the cognitive ability to care for himself.
However, even assuming the juvenile court did err in
entering this finding, the error is harmless because the relevant

i

issue for this appeal is whether Mr. Mace has the ability to care
for his child.

The Maces do not challenge that portion of the

court's finding relating to his inability to care for N.A.M.,

i

and, therefore, any error, if one exists, is harmless because it
cannot affect the outcome of the proceedings.

See State ex

rel. J.C. v. Cruz, 808 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Utah App. 1991); State in

(

re M.M.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah App. 1995).
III. THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT
THAT APPELLANTS ATTENDED FIVE OUT OF SIX
PARENTING CLASSES IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

{

The Maces' final challenge is a claim that the juvenile
court clearly erred in finding that they attended five of six
parenting classes.

(R. 410; U U.).

<

Appellants specifically

assert that the record demonstrates they attended six sessions,
(Appellantfs Br. at 28-30).

not five.

Given the Maces overall

<

dismal failure, it is not clear why they place such importance on
this fact.

Nonetheless, their argument is without merit.

The evidence regarding how many parenting sessions were
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(

held is confusing at best.

The parenting class instructor

initially testified that the parents followed through with eight
sessions, and had one more session to finish but were unable to
do so.

(T. 466 at 414). She later testified that she

consolidated her 12-week class into six weeks.

(T. 466 at 420).

The only clear fact the parenting instructor testified to was
that the parents did not finish the last session.

Appellants

failed to adequately marshal this evidence as required when
making a sufficiency challenge.

See State ex rel. M.E.C., 942

P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 1997).

Given this record evidence, the

court did not clearly err in finding the parents attended five of
six sessions.
Moreover, even if the juvenile court erred, the error
is harmless.

Any variance regarding the number of parenting

classes attended clearly would not change the outcome of this
case, given that the Maces did not challenge the findings
regarding their failure to learn appropriate parenting skills
over an 11 month period of time, irrespective of the number of
classes attended.

See State ex rel. J.C. v. Cruz, 808 P.2d

1131, 1136 (Utah App. 1991); State in re M.M.J., 908 P.2d 345,
349 (Utah App. 1995).
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
The State does not request oral argument or a published
opinion in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the juvenile court's
order terminating appellants' parental rights to N.A.M.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j2.^

da

^

of A

P r i 1 / 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

CAROL L. C. VE^DOIA
Assistant Attorney General
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78-3a-407

JUDICIAL CODE

78-3a-407. Grounds for termination of parental rights.
The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if it finds any one of the following:
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the
child;
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or abused
the child;
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent;
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home
placement under the supervision of the court or the
division, that the division or other responsible agency has
made a diligent effort to provide appropriate services and
the parent has substantially neglected, wilfully refused,
or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home
placement, and there is a substantial likelihood that the
parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the near future;
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this
chapter;
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the
parent or parents:
(a) to support or communicate with the child;
(b) to prevent neglect of the child;
(c) to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental, or emotional abuse of the child; or
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent;
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished
their parental rights to the child, and the court finds that
termination is in the child's best interest; or
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial during
which the child was returned to live in his own home,
substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or
failed to give the child proper parental care and protection.
1994
78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination.
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have abandoned a child, it is prima facie evidence of abandonment that
the parent or parents:
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have
surrendered physical custody of the child, and for a period
of six months following the surrender have not manifested
to the child or to the person having the physical custody of
the child afirmintention to resume physical custody or to
make arrangements for the care of the child;
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail,
telephone, or otherwise for six months; or
(c) failed to have shown the normal interest of a natural parent, without just cause.
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or
have neglected a child the court shall consider, but is not
limited to, the following conditions:
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent that renders him unable to care for
the immediate and continuing physical or emotional
needs of the child for extended periods of time;
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally,
or sexually cruel or abusive nature;
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors,
controlled substances, or dangerous drugs that render the
parent unable to care for the child;
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, or other
care necessary for his physical, mental, and emotional
health and development by a parent or parents who are
capable of providing that care. However, a parent who,
legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, does not provide specified medical treatment for a child is not for that
reason alone a negligent or unfit parent;

434

(e) with regard to a child who is in the custody of the
division, if the parent is incarcerated as a result of
conviction of a felony, and the sentence is of such length
that the child will be deprived of a normal home for more
than one year; or
(f) a history of violent behavior.
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division
and the parent or parents fail to comply substantially with the
terms and conditions of a plan within six months after the
date on which the child was placed or the plan was commenced, whichever occurs later, that failure to comply is
evidence of failure of parental adjustment.
(4) The following circumstances constitute prima facie evidence of unfitness:
(a) sexual abuse, injury, or death of a sibling of the
child due to known or substantiated abuse or neglect by
the parent or parents;
(b) conviction of a felony, if the facts of the crime are of
such a nature as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to
provide adequate care to the extent necessary for the
child's physical, mental, or emotional health and development; or
(c) a single incident of life-threatening or gravely disabling injury to or disfigurement of the child.
iw
78-3a-409. Specific considerations where child is not
in physical custody of parent.
(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or
parents, the court, in determining whether parental rights
should be terminated shall consider, but is not limited to, the
following:
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and
needs of the child and his desires regarding the termination, if the court determines he is of sufficient capacity to
express his desires; and
(b) the effort the parent or parents have made to adjust
their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in
the child's best interest to return him to his home after a
reasonable length of time, including but not limited to:
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute
physical care and maintenance, iffinanciallyable;
(ii) maintenance of regular visitation or other contact with the child that was designed and carried out
in a plan to reunite the child with the parent or
parents; and
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communication with the custodian of the child.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court shall disregard
incidental conduct, contributions, contacts, and communications.
i*7
78-3a-410. Specific considerations where a child hai
been placed in foster home.
If a child is in the custody of the division and has been
placed and resides in a foster home and the division institute
proceedings under this part regarding the child, with au
ultimate goal of having the child's foster parent or paren'J
adopt him, the court shall consider whether the child hai
become integrated into the foster family to the extent that hJ
familial identity is with that family, and whether the fos^
family is able and willing permanently to treat the child as a
member of the family. The court shall also consider, but is o*
limited to, the following:
(1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties exUtinf
between the child and the parents, and the child's tai
with the foster family;
(2) the capacity and disposition of the child's parent*
from whom the child was removed as compared with ttJj
of the foster family to give the child love, affection. v»
guidance and to continue the education of the child:
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DEC - I 1997

Edwin T. Peterson #3849
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorney for State of Utah
140 West 425 South (330-15)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone: (801) 722-6546
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
In the interest of:
MACE, Nicole Ann

04/22/96

A person(s) under 18 years of age.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION S OF LAW AND ORDER
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
Case No. 909850
Judge: Scott N. Johanson

This matter came before the Honorable Scott N. Johanson for trial on the State of Utah's
Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights with respect to the parental rights of Dennis
Mace and Amy Opshal Mace to the above-named Child on the 28th and 29th day of October,
1997 at 9:30 a.m. Edwin T. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the
State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"). William McCairns was present
as the representative of DCFS. Cleve Hatch appeared as the Guardian ad Litem for the abovereferenced child (the "Child"). Patricia Geary was present representing Dennis Mace and Amy
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Page 3
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Nicole Ann Mace

to a heart monitor. The child was taken into custody on April 24, 1996 and a petition for custody
filed by DCFS was adjudicated on June 5, 1996.
B.

The court returned the child to the parents under Protective Supervision. The child

was hospitalized on June 5 and hospital staff refused to release her to her parents until the parents
were trained in CPR and in the operation of the heart monitor.
C.

Because the parents did not avail themselves of the necessary training, a new petition

was filed on June 10 seeking custody be placed with DCFS.
D.

The baby was taken into protective custody on June 10 for the second time pursuant

to this second petition. Up to that time she had been in DCFS custody or in the hospital but never
in the parent's custody. Temporary custody was granted by the court on June 12, 1996, after
which DCFS began to implement a reunification plan which consisted of visitation between the
parents and the baby as often as possible, establishment of a home appropriate for a newborn,
having the parents learn parenting skills, CPR skills and heart and breath monitor skills.
E.

While this written treatment plan was very poorly drafted, almost devoid of the

specificity necessary to be understood and carried out by low functioning parents, nevertheless
DCFS made diligent efforts to provide services.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Nicole Ann Mace
I.

Through June, July and August of 1996, the parents passed the monitor training and

visits were fairly regular. However, as time went on, the aunt, with whom the parents were
living, began to handle the baby during visits, and on some occasions the parents weren't even
present. When they were present the peer parent wasfrustratedthat basic parenting skills had to
be taught over and over again at each visit because the parents weren't retaining what they had
been taught.
J.

The parent's living arrangements were unacceptable to DCFS because they were

living with various relatives or others who were either unacceptable themselves because of prior
substantiated sex abuse referrals or who's homes did not meet basic minimum standards of
cleanliness. The family received attention from DCFS in one form or another on 33 different days
from June 12 to August 30.
K.

In late August the parents appeared to begin to lose interest in the baby. The parents

accepted the responsibility of requesting further visits. Visits became sporadic and then ceased.
The parents continued to have unstable living arrangements. At one point DCFS and the parents'
attorney lost track of the parents altogether because of their moving. They told the peer parent
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Nicole Ann Mace
the foster family.

The foster home was stable and satisfactory.

The baby was ahead

developmental^ and had outgrown the need for the heart and breath monitor. She recognized the
foster parents as fulfilling the roles of parents in her life.
0.

A second reunification treatment plan was implemented with a beginning date of

January 1, 1997, although the signatures bear the date of February 6, 1997. This treatment plan
had more detail than the first one and therefore it was more easily understood and helpful to the
parents. Visitation was still the key factor in reunification with the first four visits specified to
be held at the DCFS office for one hour, all to be completed within four weeks. Thereafter the
visits were allowed in the parents' home and could be longer. Transportation and cancellation
policies were clear, as was designation of who could be present, and who was to supervise the
visits.
P.

In addition, parenting classes were required, as well as appropriate housing, peer

parenting, and a vague requirement to "explore occupational and educational opportunities" and
to "plan financially for their family and work towards self-sufficiency."
Q.

Visits were re-established for December 23 but the parents' attorney failed to notify

the parents and the first visit since August was January 2, 1997. Visits on January 16 and January
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T.

In March a bonding assessment evaluation was conducted on the baby, the parents

and the foster parents by the Family and Attachment Center, the conclusion of which was that
there was no significant bond between the baby and the parents and that the parents lacked the
basic parenting skills necessary to care for her emotional and physical well-being. Conversely
the baby exhibited secure healthy and normal parent/child attachment to the foster parents.
U.

Also in March a second parenting class was offered to the parents. They failed to

attend any of the classes but did attend five of six sessions arranged independent of DCFS by the
parents' attorney with the attorney's sister, who had taught parenting classes in the past. The
parents missed approximately one-half of the scheduled visits with the baby in March and April.
On some of those visits the parents showed up late after the baby and the foster parents had left.
Peer parenting continued through April with no significant change in parenting skills. The baby
was treating the visits as visits with strangers or at best acquaintances, but not as parents, with
some increasing anxiety and some sleep loss after the visits. The parents seemed uncomfortable
and relieved to get the visits over with.
V.

The court terminated the DCFS obligation to attempt to reunify the family on April

24,1997. Since that time there has been no visitation or other communication between the parents
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C.

The father is unfit or incompetent within the meaning of 78-3a-407(3) in that his

mental deficiency renders him unable to care for the immediate and continuous physical or
emotional needs of the child for an extended period of time.
D.

This child has been in an out of home placement since birth, and DCFS for a period

of 12 months made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services. The parents neglected,
refused or were unwilling or unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out of home
placement. The court notes that the 78-3a-407(4) does not require that the circumstances to be
remedied are those which caused the original removal. Rather the statute requires the remedying
of the circumstances that cause out of home placement. In other words, the causes of the out of
home placement are fluid as dangers to the child change while the child is in out of home
placement. While the primary cause of the original removal was the need to train the parents on
the operation of the heart/breath monitor, it immediately became clear that the parents were not
capable of providing the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or other care necessary for
her physical, mental and emotional health and development. This parental unfitness caused the
continued out of home placement and must be considered in an analysis of 78-3a-407(4) along
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G.

The court concludes that while parental rights are constitutionally protected, the

legislature is not prevented from altering the statutory grounds for termination. Protecting
children and providing permanency for them are compelling state interests. The addition of
Section (4), (5), and (6) to 78-3a-407 was within the province of the legislature to do, and these
subsections are not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore are not unconstitutional.
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
A.

After consideration of the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child, the

efforts that the parents have made to adjust to make it in the child's best interest to return home
within a reasonable time, the lack of regular visitation and the failure to maintain regular contact
and communication, the court concludes that it is in the best interest of this child that the
parent/child relationship between her and her natural parents be terminated.
B.

The child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that her familial

identity is with that family. The foster family is able and willing to permanently treat the child
as a member of the family. There exists a love, affection and other emotional ties between the
child and the foster parents which does not exist/between the child and the parents. The capacity
and disposition of the foster parents to give the child love, affection and guidance and to continue
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5.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(2), this order does not disentitle the Child

to any benefit due her from any third person, including, but not limited to, any Indian tribe,
agency, state, or the United States.
6.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(3), the parents shall forthwith neither be

entitled to any notice of proceedings for the adoption of the child nor shall have any right to object
to the adoption or to participate in any other placement proceedings.
7.

In accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-412, a review of this matter, including

the dispositional phase of this matter, shall be held within 90 days.
DATED this ^

day of ^ W H ^ I

, 1997.

BY THE COURT
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